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Based on  data from  92 Minnesota cities, the  analyses  shows
that neither marginal price or average price appear as  the  better
predictor of  demand.  The price elasticity of demand ranges  from
-. 17  for marginal  price in  the linear model  to  -.27  for average
price in  the log  linear model.  It  appears  from  the analysis  that
many consumers are unaware  of the marginal price  of their water.
Thus  utilities  should  simplify  their  pricing  structures and
present consumers with an easy to  understand costs  of water  such
as  the  cost of six hours  of  lawn watering.ALTERNATIVE  PRICE SPECIFICATION FOR MUNICIPAL WATER DEMANDS:
AN EMPIRICAL TEST.
by
Stephen Frerichs, Nir Becker and K.  William Easter'
Water  as  a  commodity  exhibits  diverse,  demand
characteristics.  Understandably,  the  demand  components  -for
municipal water  are quite heterogeneous.  A portion of municipal
water demand reflects the  basic human subsistence need for water,
for which no  substitute may exist.  Other components of municipal
water  demand,  e.g.,  lawn  watering,  have  a  wider  range  of
substitutes and are more price responsive.
Measuring  the  price  responsiveness  of  municipal  water
consumers  over  the  past  twenty  years  has  been  subject  to
considerable  theoretical  and  empirical  debate.  Three major
polemics can be characterized.  The  first  controversy concerns
the correct  price specification  when block  price scheduling  is
used,  i.e.,  do consumers respond  to  marginal  price  or average
price under block pricing  (Taylor 1975,  Nordin  1976,  Billings and
Agthe  1980,  Foster and Beattie  1981,  Howe  1982,  Opaluch  1982,
Polzin 1984,  and Chicoine  and Ramamurthy  1986).  To date  only
three direct statistical comparisons between average and marginal
price under  block rate  pricing exist  (Foster and Beattie  1981,
Polzin 1984  and Chicoine and  Ramamurthy,  1986).  The  second
'The  authors  would  like  to thank M.  L.  Livingston,  Steve
Taff, and Jean Kinsey  for there  insightful comments  on  earlier
drafts.
1problem is  simultaneity  in  the demand equation since under block
pricing, quantity  also  determines  price  (Howe  and Linaweaver
1967,  Opaluch  1982,  and  Charney and  Woodward 1984).  The  third
problem  is  bias  in  aggregate  data - because  the  average
consumption  for  a  utility  may  not  determine  the appropriate
marginal  price  (Schefter and David,  1985).
The  objective  of  this  report  is  to  address  the three
estimation  problems  outlined  above,  using  survey  data  from
Minnesota  municipalities.  This  study  expands  the  empirical
evidence by  testing  for differences between average and marginal
price  specifications  under  block  pricing.  Problems  of
simultaneity  and  bias  are  recognized  in  the  paper as well.
Finally, a  test  is  conducted  to  determine  if  differences  in
demand for water exist  between large and small cities.
CONSUMER RESPONSE
All  three  estimation problems  can  be traced  to  the  pricing
schedules  under  which  municipal  water  is  sold.  Water,
electricity and  natural gas  are commonly sold under a  block rate
or multi-part  tariff structure.  The  resulting non-linear budget
constraint faced  by a  consumer  poses  several problems  for the
specification and  estimation  of  a  demand  function  under  the
neoclassical  theory of consumer behavior  (Taylor 1975).
The  block  rate  or-  multi-part  tariff structure  is a non-
linear pricing schedule  such that the  price per  unit changes  at
2pre-specified points  in  the  pricing schedule as the  quantity of
consumption  increases  (Figure 1).  The  resulting pricing blocks
may either  increase or  decrease as  quantity consumed increases,
In figure  1, two  .hypothetical households,  each purchasing water
from different-  utilities, face  two distinctly different pricing
schedules.  Household  1-  faces  a  declining block  price schedule
from P 1 i  to  P1 2.  Whereas household 2 must purchase water within
an  increasing  block rate schedule  from P2 1 to  P22.
The  empirical  specification  and  estimation  problems  occur
when a  household consumes  in  any block but  the  first,  e.g. at  Q*
in  Figure  1.  At  Q* the  marginal  price  for  households  1  and  2  are
equal  at  P1 2  and  P2 2  . The average price for household  1 is
[P1 1Qi  +  P12  IQ*-Q  ]/  Q*  and  for  household  2,  [P2 1 QI+  P22 IQ*-
Q1l]/Q*.  Although the marginal prices for  the two  domiciles are
equal,  the average prices are not.
The  income effects  for the two  consumers are  also different
as  household  l's  cost for  Q*  is  greater than  that of household  2.
Therefore, when  empirically estimating  demand across households
using marginal price as  a predictor given block pricing, one must
account for the difference  in  the  intramarginal  rates,  Pi 1 and
P2 1 (Taylor, 1975).
PRICE SPECIFICATION
Nordin, in  1976,  argued  for  incorporating  a D  variable to
account  for the differing  income effects  of a  decreasing block
3schedule.  The  D  variable was defined as  the difference between
the  actual total bill  and the  hypothetical bill,  had the total
quantity been  purchased at  the marginal  price.  In  Figure 1, the
D variable equals  (Pi~-P12)Qi  for household  1.  The  D variable is
positive  for  decreasing  blocks  and  negative  for  increasing
blocks.
Another  debate  has  arisen  over  the  correct  price
specification:  Do municipal users  respond to  average price or to
marginal price/D  variable  specification  under  block pricing? 2
(Foster and  Beattie  1981,  Howe  1982,  Opaluch  1982,  Polzin  1984
and Chicoine and Ramamurthy  1986).  Implicitly,  this question
addresses  the  sophistication  of  the  water  consumer.  If  the
consumers respond to  the  marginal price  they are  assumed to be
well  informed  about the  pricing schedule.  If  the consumers are
uniformed about  the pricing schedule,  they will  likely respond to
a perceived notion of average  price.
Foster and Beattie, Polzin, and Chicoine and Ramamurthy have
made  direct  statistical  comparisons  between  the  predictive
ability  using  average  and  marginal  price.  Foster and Beattie
concluded that the use  of average  price was  justified;  whereas
Polzin and  Chicoine and Ramamurthy found no  statistical evidence
to  support  one  specification  over the  other.  -Polzin did favor
2Nordin  hypothesized  that  the  estimated  D  variable
coefficient  should equal  that  of  the  income  variable  in  the
demand  equation.  Early  failure  of  this  equality  led  to
speculation that average price may be  the correct price variable.
4average  price  as  a more efficient predictor  as  it  uses  one  less
degree  of  freedom  than  the  marginal  price/D  variable
specification without  losing any predictive  power.  Chicoine and
Ramamurthy found  a decomposed  measure  of  average price to  best
fit  their data.
Chicoine and Ramamurthy  employed  a  model  hypothesized by
Opaluch  (1982)  to  test  the responsiveness  of consumers to  either
marginal price  (MP) or average price  (AP).  The demand function:
Q=Bo+BiPx  BP  3(PP)/+  B  B(P-P)Q/Q+  B4(Y-P2 Q-(PI-P2)Q  ) }+E,
where:  Px  = an index of  relevant prices
P2 = the marginal price
(PI-P2)Ql  =  the D variable
Y  =  average household  income
P2Q-(Pl-P 2 )Qi  =  the income effect  of the water bill
Ql  =  intramarginal  quantity
Q  =  total  quantity
Pi  =  intramarginal price
E  =  error  term.
This  function is employed  in  instances  where  the  household
consumes  in  the  second  block of  the  pricing  schedule.
However, the model  is  expandable  to household consumption  in any
n block  rate structure  provided n  does not  equal  1  (C/R, 1986).
The  function uses  a decomposed  measure  of  average  price where
average price  (AP) equals, P2+(PI-P2)QI/Q or MP+ D/Q.  Two tests
5can then be  instituted:
Test  1  Test  2
Ho:  B3=O  Ho:  B2=B3
Ha:  B3 ￿0  Ha:  B2 ￿B 3
where:  B2  and B3 are coefficients  from the demand function given
above.
Opaluch hypothesizes that  four results  from  the two tests
are possible.  First, both null hypotheses,  Ho,  are  rejected;  in
this  case,  the  data is  inconsistent  with the  models  of consumer
behavior which  include  either  marginal  or  average price as the
price variable.  This result  suggests,  that  the  above Opaluch
model  with  the  decomposed  measure  of  average  price  is  the
appropriate specification.  Second,  if  the  null  hypothesis  of
test  1  is  not  rejected, but that of test  2 is,  the data support
the  "well informed"  consumer hypothesis,  i.e.,  consumers respond
to marginal  price.  Alternatively, if  the null hypothesis of  test
1 is  rejected, but  that  of  test  2  is  not,  the  "uninformed"
consumer  hypothesis  is  supported,i.e.,  consumers  respond  to
average price.  Finally,  if  both  null  hypotheses  fail  to  be
rejected, two possibilities occur.  Either B2=B 3=0, which  implies
consumers do.not respond to  price  or  B2  may  be  significantly
differenti'rom 0 but B3 is  neither significantly different from 0
nor B2 . In  this latter  case,  the  data  may  be  weak  or some
consumers  react  to  average price, while others react  to marginal
price  (Opaluch 1985).
6SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM
Opaluch's demand function makes  the problem  of simultaneity
obvious  by  including  total  consumption  on  both sides of  the
equation.  With  a  block  pricing  schedule,  the  problem  of
simultaneity is  pervasive.  (Taylor 1975,  Nordin  1976,  Howe and
Linaweaver  1967,  Terza and Welch  1982,  Opaluch  1984,  C/R 1986).
In  demand  theory, price  determines quantity consumed.  However,
with block pricing, quantity consumed also  determines the price.
The  error  terms  are  thus  correlated  with  price,  a flagrant
violation of the assumptions  of Ordinary  Least Squares  (Weisberg
1985).  Although  this  issue is  now well  recognized, no  consensus
exists  on how to  resolve  it.
BIAS  IN AGGREGATE DATA
The  third issue recently propounded  is  one  of  price bias
when  using  aggregate  data  (Schefter  and  David 1985).  Given
aggregate data,  the mean marginal price  and mean  D variable are
the appropriate  measures  for  marginal  price and the  D  variable.
Most consumer behavior data averages  across  consumers within one
utility to  derive the  average consumption  per household within
the utility.  The average consumption  is then  used to determine
the mean  marginal price  in  that utility's block-price  schedule.
Depending on the distribution  of households  in  each  rate block,
this  may  or  may  not  be  the actual  mean marginal price  and the
mean D variable measure  for the utility.  Therefore,  the measures
"7of  marginal  price  and  the  D  variable may be biased when  the
average consumption across the utility  is  used to  determine the
mean marginal price and the mean D  variable.
Schefter  and  David  demonstrate  that  small changes  in  the
variance of  the  distribution  of  households  in  a  rate block,
change  the  measurement  of  marginal  price  and the D variable.
These changes  are  sufficient  to  induce the  theoretically expected
results  that the estimated D variable and income coefficients  are
equal.  Ideally then,  when estimating  the aggregate  demand  for
goods  sold under a block price  schedule, an  estimate is  needed of
the  distribution  of  households  in  each  block.  Otherwise
estimates  of  the mean  marginal price and mean D variable may be
biased.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
A  1986  Water Rates  Survey of  all  incorporated municipalities
in Minnesota  provided water  use  and water  rate data for ninety-
two municipalities.  The  aggregate  annual,  metered  residential
consumption data per city was  reported in  the  surveys, along with
the  total  number  of  metered' residential  water  connections.
Average  water  use  per  connection  was  calculated and used to
determine marginal price, the D variable,  average price  and the
total water bill per billing period. 3
3 We  recognize  the  bias  in  the  marginal.price and the  D
variable specifications which  may  result  from  using  aggregate
data across  utilities.  However, a distribution of households  by
rate block was  not available from the  survey.
8Further variables  included in  the model  to  estimate water
demand  were  average  annual  income  per  household by city, the
average number of persons  per  household  by  city  and  the  mean
proportion  of  youth  per  household  by  city 4. These were all
obtained  from the  1980 Census.  An assumption  was  made  that one
service connection represented one household.  Problems with this
assumption arise  when apartment  buildings  are  included  in the
total  residential annual consumption figures  of the surveys.
Survey  respondents  were  asked  to  omit  apartments  from
residential consumption figures;  however,  some  utilities could
not  separate apartments from  residential housing.  The  result may
be  that the average daily consumption figures were  biased upward
for  some  municipalities.  However, the one  service connection
equals  one household assumption  was  used  because many municipal
households  in  Minnesota have  private wells,  even  in the  larger
cities.  Thus,  if population or households per city were  used to
calculate  the  average  daily  use  per  household,  the average
consumption would have been underestimated.  This would  be more
of  a problem than  including some apartment buildings.
Two general models were employed to  estimate demand:
Estimation I  (Marginal price/D variable specification):
Qd=Bo+  B1 Y+  B2N+ B3U+ B4Pm+  BsD+  e.  and/or
4 The  Census defines  youth as  anyone under the age of  18.
9Estimation  II  (Average price specification):
Qd  =Bo+  B1 Y  +  B2 N+  B3U+  B4 Pa +  6.
where:  Ps= marginal price  Y= average  income/household
Pa= average price  N= average # of people/household.
D=  D variable  6=  error  term
U=  average proportion of youth/household.
Qd=  average daily water consumption/household
RESULTS  AND DISCUSSION
Two  functional  forms  for  each estimation were tested:  the
additive  (linear)  and  the  multiplicative  (log-linear)  model 5 .
The  linear model was  employed in  order to construct a model which
allowed a  change in  the elasticity over  the  range of  independent
variables.  The price  elasticity is  given by:  e-=(8q/8p)(P/Q).
The relative  ratio  of  Q and P are  important as  the partial  slope
of the  demand.  In water  demand studies,  one would expect  that
the elasticity of demand  for water would change between the  first
and last unit  of water.
Linear Model
The  linear  demand estimations  I  and  II  differ  in their use
of price  predictors  (Table  1).  For  estimate  I,  the price
specification  is  marginal  price  and the  D variable, while for
estimate  II,  the  .relevant  price  variable  is  average price.
5 A  Box-Cox  log-likelihood  function was calculated for the
response  following  Weisberg,  1985  (Chapter  6).  The-  95%
confidence  interval  for  L(x)  contained the  log-linear, square
root  and  linear  transformations.  Of  these,  the  log-linear
transformation and linear  form were felt  to  best fit  the data.
10Estimations  III  and IV  are  the  same  as  I and II  respectively,
except for  the  inclusion of  a  dummy variable  for large cities 6 .
The  Dummy  variable was  included to  test for differences  in water
consumption by city size as  the data set  encompasses  a wide range
of city sizes.
Neither price  specification appears  superior to the other.
Notably,  the D variable  is  not  significantly different  from 0.
Also,  the  dummy variable  is  insignificant  in both estimations,
indicating that there  is  no difference  in  water  demand by city
size  in Minnesota.
As  expected,  R2  is  low  in  all  the  estimations.  This  is
typical  of studies which  are  based  on cross-sectional  data.  A
problem with cross-sectional  data is posed by the assumption that
differences  in  demand  between  cities  are  confined  to  the
variables  in  the model.  Obviously,  this assumption  is  simplistic
because city characteristics  such as population density, climate,
etc.,  may also influence water use.  Other studies  that estimated
demand using cross  sectional data report  R2's  in  the same  range
(Wong 1972,  Clark and Asce  1976,  Foster and Beattie  1979).
The  income  elasticity  is  +0.60 and  the price elasticities
are  - 0.17  and  - 0.19  for'  the  marginal  and  average price
respectively.  All  of  the elasticities  are computed at the mean
and are  inelastic.  This  supports the  findings  of other studies,
as  both  the price  and income elasticities  have the hypothesized
6 A  large city  is  defined  as  having  an  excess  of 5,000
service connections  (roughly 20,000  citizens).
11sign  and  are  of  similar  magnitude  to  those  found  in  other
studies.  (Wong  1972,  Batchelor  1975,  Howe and Linaweaver  1976)
The  elasticities  do  not  capture  the  difference between
winter  and  summer  use  of  water which if  it could be  included
would increase  the elasticities.  The  analysis  also  does  not
consider weather  effects because  of  the relative homogeneity of
the  study area.
The  coefficient of  the  persons  per  household  variable  is
positive  and  significantly  different  from 0.  The persons  per
household  variable captures  the  effect  of  increasing a household
size  by  one  person.  This  helps  explain  the  estimated  negative
coefficient  of  the  proportion of  youth  variable.
A positive correlation between  the proportion  of  youth  and
water  consumption  was  anticipated.  However, the persons  per
household  has  captured  the  size  effect,  which  means  the
differences  in  the  proportion  of  youth  in  a household will
capture the substitution effect between an adult  and a child.  As
the proportion  of youth in  a household  increases, a reduction in
the proportion of adults  in  the  household occurs.  The estimated
negative  coefficient  indicates  that although children may have
less  incentive to conserve water, an adult  uses more water than a
child.
Log Linear Model
The  overall  goodness  of  fit  of  the log-linear model  is
slightly better than  the linear model  (Table 2).  This  is  true
12for  the  overall  F,  the R2 and the adjusted R2 . The t-values of
the persons per household coefficients are  increased and  are now
significant at  the  90%  level,  while  in the linear model  they are
significant only at  the 80%  level.  Again, the D variable and the
dummy  variable  in  demand  estimations  III  and  IV  are  not
significant.  There is  also  no 'significant  difference  in  the
intercept  term due  to city size.'
The  price  elasticities  for  the complete  sample  case  are
-0.21  for the marginal price and -0.27  for the average price. The
price  variable  is  not  the  sole  variable that determines  the
absolute level of  the  demand  for  water.  Income  is  another
significant variable with a calculated elasticity of 0.6.
Part of  the reason that income and price do not  singularly
determine  the  water  consumption  level  is  that  demographic
variables  also  have  an  influence.  Persons  per household and
proportion of  youth are  two of  those variables  that appear in
this  model.  Persons  per household's  elasticity is  0.5,  which
means  at the margin,  one  additional  person  will  increase  the
total  absolute  consumption  of  the  household  by  50%.  The
proportion of  youth elasticity  is  -0.43,  thus  substituting  one
child  for  one  adult  will  result  in  a reduction of the total
household consumption by 43%.
The aggregate log-linear model  is  tested  to  determine if
13there  is  a difference  in water  consumption by city size. 7 For
the  larger cities, R 2 is  significantly  improved over  the  total
while it  declines slightly  for the  small cities  (Table 3).  In
contrast, the computed overall  F is  significantly reduced.  This
is  due  to  the  fact that the computed F  is  sensitive to  the number
of observations while R 2 is not.
The  test of stability of  the  aggregate set  of observations
is  given  in  Table  4.  The  low F values  for the  total model
indicate  that the null  hypothesis  (there is  no  difference between
7 This  is  actually a special case  of a  linear hypothesis with
two samples.  The  first group of cities has T1 and the  second T2
observations.  The unrestricted model  is  given by:
Y::  X  0  [  [::
Y2  0  X2  2  E 2
We desire  to  test  whether  11=132,  where  lB  and  32  are  two
sets  of coefficients under the null hypothesis the model  becomes:
Yl  Xi  61
I  ]I=  [z  ]  [:: Y2  X2  6l
The  sum of  squares of  the residuals under  Ho  will  be  shown
to equal  the sum  of squares  under H1 (13i=132)  plus  the  sum of
squares  of the deviations between the two  sets  of estimates  of  Y
under these two hypothesis.
The  ratio  between the  latter two  sums,  adjusted for  their
numbers  of degrees of freedom,  will  be  shown  to  follow  an F
distribution if  the null  hypothesis  is  true.  The  F test  is  given
by:
F=  (exiex  - ele)/q  "F  (qlTl+T2-#13)
ele/(T +T2-#13)
Where  q  is  the number of  coefficients  in  the subset,  i.e.,
#B1  or  #B2  and #3i  =#32  and #B's=#Bi+#B2.  (# = number  of)
14large  and  small  cities)  cannot  be  rejected.  However,  the
individual price and income  coefficients of  the separate demand
functions  appear to  be different  for the  large and small cities.
The  larger cities are more price responsive than the  smaller
cities  (Table 3).  The  marginal  price coefficient  in  the  larger
cities  is  -.5  (average  price -.42)  while  in the  smaller cities
the marginal price coefficient  is  -. 19  (average price -.25).  The
larger cities  are also more responsive  to  changes  in  income.  The
income variable coefficient  in  the larger cities  is  .92  compared
to  .57  in  the  smaller ones.  This  indicates  larger cities are
more price and  income  responsive  on  the  margin  than smaller
cities.
As  a  whole,  the larger cities  tend to have less complicated
rate  structures,  i.e.,  fewer  rate  blocks,  than  the smaller
cities.  The less  complicated rate structures may contribute to
the greater  price  responsiveness  of  consumers  in  the  larger
cities.  It  could also be that households  in  larger cities  are
using  a larger proportion of water for marginal  purposes  such as
lawn watering.
THE  OPALUCH  MODEL
The  Opaluch  model  is  also employed  to  test  the households
response to marginal or  to  average  prices 8 Recall that  a new
variable must  be  created,  -the decomposed measure  of the average
8The Opaluch test  requires that a household consumes  in any
block but  the  first.  Only 39  observations  from  the data set were
available  for  this test.
15price.  The decomposed measure  of  average  price  is  MP  +  D/Q,
where D/Q  equals Decom  in Table 5.  In addition, the  D variable
is  subtracted from Y to  form a new  variable:  Incoml.  The  two
tests are:
Test  1  Test  2
Ho:  Decom=O  Ho:  MP=Decom
Ha:  Decom￿O  Ha:  MP￿Decom
The results  can be  summarized as:
Test  1  Test  2
Linear form:  cannot reject Ho  cannot reject Ho
at  5%  level  at  5%  level
Log  linear:  cannot reject Ho  cannot reject Ho
at  5%  level  at  5%  level
For both the  linear and log linear models neither hypothesis
can  be  rejected.  One  can  conclude  that  MP=Decom=O,  i.e.,
consumers  are  not  responding  to  price.  Given that only 39
observations were available for the Opaluch  model, the  data may
not be  sufficient for  the estimation which probably explains  the
low t-values.  The  fact  that  both  marginal  price  and average
price  are  significant  in  the  earlier  models  when  all  92
observations  are  included  would  refute  the  conclusion  that
consumers do  not respond  to  price-  at all.  At  best, we cannot
conclude anything concerning which variable  is  better to  use  as
the price specification in  the demand equation.  Given the  cross-
sectional nature of the data,  the variance  in block rates and the
relative  insignificance  of water bills  in relation to  income,  the
conclusion  that some consumers respond to average price  and some
to marginal price seems  the most reasonable.
16MODEL ADJUSTMENTS
A  Cook's distance test  is  performed to check for outliers  or
influential cases.'  Four observations are  significant at  the  95%
level and  dropped.  Dropping  the  outliers  did  not  improve the
average price  estimates  but  did  improve  the  marginal price
estimates  (Tables  6 and  7).  In  fact,  the t-value on  the average
price  in  the  log-linear  case  decreased.  The  F  and  R 2 were
improved with both functional  forms.
IMPLICATIONS
Neither Polzin,  Chicoine and Ramamurthy, nor this  study has
been able to conclude  which price  specification  (marginal price
or average  price)  is  the better predictor  for  goods  sold under a
multipart tariff structure.  Implicitly this  issue  involves the
consumer's awareness  of the  rate  structure under which the good
is  sold.  In  the case of municipal water demand, where any person
capable of  turning a  faucet can consume water,  it  is reasonable
to  assume  that  many  consumers  are  unaware  of  actual  rate
structures.  For water  policy makers wishing  to  influence water
consumption  through price,  a simple  rate  structure would  be  the
most  desirable..  Simple  rate structures  that do not decline with
use  would  promote  a  greater  awareness  of  water  rates among
consumers  and  perhaps  water  conservation  through pricing.  In
17addition, if  water  conservation  through  pricing  is wanted,
utilities  should  provide  water  rate  information  in  a  more
understandable  form  to  the water consumer,  e.g.,  given this  price
for water  an  average  lawn watering  for one  hour with a garden
hose  costs  "X"  dollars.
CONCLUSIONS
The  low R2 values suggest.  that  the variables included  in  the
water  demand  model  do  not  play  the  major role in Minnesota
household water consumption decisions.  However,  these variables
are  part of  the relevant variables that influence  the residential
demand for water as demonstrated by their respective t-values.
The  average price is  a slightly  better predictor  than  the
marginal price  when the complete sample  is  used but  the marginal
price  is  found to  be  a  better predictor  when the  outliers are
omitted.  The  Opaluch  model  produced  inconclusive  results.
Economic theory tells us  that the  well  informed  consumer will
respond to  the marginal price.  But within the  context of complex
block  pricing structures,  the consumer may not know  the marginal
price.  The  statistical  results suggest  that  some consumers
respond to average price, while others respond to marginal price.
Finally,  if  utilities and water policy planners  desire  to  affect
water consumption/conservation with water pricing, a  simple non-
declining  rate  structure  combined  with  consumer  pertinent
information would be  advisable.
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Figure  1:  Increasing  and  Decreasing  Block  Pricing  Schedules
Facing  Two  Hypothetical  Households
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D.F.  87.0  88.0
Overall  F  6.96  9.36
Adjusted  R2  0.24  0.27
R2  0.29  0.30




































































































Log Linear Municipal Water Demand Functions
by City Size
Demand Functions
Large Cities  Small Cities
I.  II.  I.  II.  I.
-8.48  -4.75  -1.48  -1.32  -1.'
(-2.52)  (-1.46)  (-0.83)  (-0.79)  (-1.
1.24  0.92  0.58  0.57  0.!
(3.92)  (2.96)  (3.07)  (1.28)  (4.:
0.64  0.53  0.53  0.52  0.!
(1.79)  (1.36)  (1.26)  (1.28)  (1.'
-0.69  -0.27  -0.41  -0.45  -0.
(-1.78)  (-0.72)  (-2.07)  (-2.33)  (-2.
-0.50  -.185  -0.:
(-3.04)  (-2.09)  (-2.
-0.019  -0.007  -0.(




































































Stability of  the  Log  Linear
Municipal  Water  Demand  Function  by  City  Size
R.S.S.  D.F.
I.  II.  I.  II.
F  Ratio
I.  II.
Large cities  1.12
Small Cities  5.40
Total 7.18
Note:  Fo.gs(6.78)  =  2.23
Fo.9 9 (6.78)  =  3.05
Fo.  9(5.80)  =  2.33









84 87 1.33 0.53Table  5


































































































Log  Linear  Municipal  Water  Demand  Functions















































Variables  Mean  S.D.  N  Median  Min.  Max.
Income  21,130  5,764  93  21,010  10,952  36,110
Persons/HH  2.77  0.47  93  2.69  .1.97  4.59
Youth  (Prop.)  0.30  0.06  93  0.31  0.14  0.43
Quantity  Cons.  236.70  83.83  93  212.70  95.66  454.60
Marginal  Price  0.91  0.44  93  0.85  0.30  2.65
Total  Bill  21.21  10.85  93  17.19  8.27  78.19
Average  price  1.03  0.44  93  0.95  0.30  2.65
D  Variable  1.13  1.94  93  0.00  1.25  9.10
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